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On the (in)-approximability of Bayesian Revenue
Maximization for a Combinatorial Buyer
NATALIE COLLINA∗, Princeton University
S. MATTHEWWEINBERG†, Princeton University
We consider a revenue-maximizing single seller withm items for sale to a single buyer whose value v(·) for
the items is drawn from a known distribution D of support k . A series of works by Cai et al. establishes that
when each v(·) in the support of D is additive or unit-demand (or c-demand), the revenue-optimal auction
can be found in poly(m,k) time.
We show that going barely beyond this, even to matroid-based valuations (a proper subset of Gross Substi-
tutes), results in strong hardness of approximation. Specifically, even on instances withm items and k ≤ m
valuations in the support of D, it is not possible to achieve a 1/m1−ε -approximation for any ε > 0 to the
revenue-optimal mechanism for matroid-based valuations in (randomized) poly-time unless NP ⊆ RP (note
that a 1/k-approximation is trivial).
Cai et al.’s main technical contribution is a black-box reduction from revenue maximization for valuations
in class V to optimizing the difference between two values in class V . Our main technical contribution is
a black-box reduction in the other direction (for a wide class of valuation classes), establishing that their
reduction is essentially tight.
CCS Concepts: • Theory of computation→ Algorithmic mechanism design.
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1 INTRODUCTION
“Multi-dimensional mechanism design” has been a driving force in Mathematical Economics since
Myerson’s seminal work [29], and also in Algorithmic Game Theory since its introduction to TCS
by seminal work of Chawla, Hartline, and Kleinberg [12]. The problem has gained broad interest
within TCS owing to the complexity of optimal solutions [5, 16–20, 25, 26, 30–32]. In light of this,
there now exists a substantial body of work providing algorithms to find optimal (or approximately
optimal) auctions, accepting that the resulting solution may be randomized, non-monotone, or not
particularly simple [1–3, 6–9, 21, 22].
To properly parse the results of our work, we need to be clear about the input model and objec-
tive. The seller hasm items for sale to a single buyer, and is given as input an explicit finite-support
distribution D over valuation functions in some classV (given by listing the valuations along with
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the probability with which they are drawn from D).1 The designer’s goal is to output a descrip-
tion of an auction which (approximately) maximizes expected revenue. The main positive results
of these prior works provide poly-time algorithms for the revenue-optimal multi-buyer auction,
when all buyers are additive/unit-demand/c-demand (which of course imply poly-time algorithms
for a single buyer as well, although the single-buyer case does not require many of the developed
tools).2 [9] also establishes a hardness result: there exists a constant d such that it is not possible to
guarantee a 1/md -approximation for a single buyer whose valuation is submodular3 in poly-time
unless NP ⊆ RP. Our first main result establishes that revenue-maximization is inapproximable
immediately beyond c-demand valuations:
Informal Theorem1 (See Theorem 13). Unless NP ⊆ RP, for all ε > 0, there is no poly-time 1/m1−ε
approximation to the revenue-optimal auction for a single buyer whose values form items are drawn
from a distribution of support ≤ m over matroid-based valuations.4
Importantly, note that a 1/support(D)-approximation is trivial, so Theorem 13 rules out essen-
tially any non-trivial approximation. To best understand our proof of Theorem 13, we must first
overview the proof approach of [9] for their positive results. [9] establishes an approximation-
preserving black-box reduction from revenue-maximization when all valuations come from class
V (refer to this problem as MDMDP(V), formal definition in Section 2) to maximizing the dif-
ference of two functions in V (refer to this problem as ODP(V), formal definition in Section 2).
For simple classes like additive valuations, ODP is easy, and this yields their positive results. For
complex valuation classes like submodular, [9] establish thatODP is hard, and this intuition drives
their inapproximability result.
However, [9] lacks a formal reduction fromODP toMDMDP. Using intuition thatODP(submodular)
is hard, they directly construct hardMDMDP instances. Our next main result is a reduction from
ODP toMDMDP. That is, the [9] reduction is essentially tight.
Informal Theorem2 (See Theorem11). For suitableV , there is a black-box reduction fromODP(V)
to MDMDP(V) which is almost approximation-preserving.
Theorem 11 allows us to reason exclusively about hardness of ODP, and conclude hardness for
MDMDP. Our final result provides a clean framework to quickly establish when ODP(V) is inap-
proximable, and proves thatODP(matroid-based) is indeed inapproximable (and also that matroid-
based is suitable for the reduction in Theorem 11).
1.1 Context and Related Work
The context in which to view our work is the following: [9] establishes a reduction fromMDMDP
to ODP, and our Theorem 11 establishes a reduction from ODP to MDMDP, so their reduction
is tight. Moreover, ODP is now a simple lens through which one can study (tightly!) the compu-
tational complexity of mechanism design — revenue-maximizing Bayesian mechanism design for
valuations in class V is exactly as hard as maximizing the difference of two functions in V ([9]
provides one direction of the reduction, and we provide the other).
Two previous works prove hardness of revenue maximization in this model. As already dis-
cussed, [9] uses intuition from hardness of ODP(submodular) to directly construct hard instances
1We will formally specify in Section 2 how valuation functions are presented as input, but quickly note that all results in
this line of work (including ours) are compatible with any standard input format, such as value oracles, demand oracles,
or an explicit poly-sized circuit which computes either query.
2A valuation is c-demand if v(S ) := maxT ⊆S, |T |≤c {
∑
i∈T v({i })}. Additive valuations arem-demand, and Unit-demand
valuations are 1-demand.
3A function v(·) is submodular if v(S ∩T ) +v(S ∪ T ) ≤ v(S ) +v(T ) for all S, T .
4A matroid-based valuation satisfies v(S ) := maxT ⊆S,T ∈I {
∑
i∈T v({i })}, where I is a matroid.
for MDMDP(submodular). They even provide a partial framework for proving similar results
(whichwe overview in Section 2). Our results improve these by replacing submodularwithmatroid-
based (a vastly more restrictive class — it is a proper subset of gross substitutes), and by providing
a true reduction from ODP to MDMDP.
The other known hardness result is from [23], who establish that MDMDP(OXS)5 is NP-hard
to solve exactly. Their proof does follow a principled framework, and they establish roughly that
whenever ODP(V) is hard to solve exactly, that MDMDP(V) is hard to solve exactly as well.
Their framework, however, is very clearly limited to exact hardness.6 Our results improve these by
providing an approximation-preserving framework, which allows for hardness of approximation.
There is also a long series of related work in the independent itemsmodel [4, 10–15, 24, 28, 31, 33].
Here, the distributionD is not given explicitly by listing its support, but some form of sample access
(or other concise description) is given instead. The restriction is that D satisfies “independent
items”. We refer the reader to [31] for the general definition, but the example to have in mind
is an additive buyer, where independent items simply means that v({i}) is drawn independently
of v({j}) for all i , j . Observe that inputting such a distribution explicitly in our model would
require input of size exp(m). So the way to reconcile works such as [16–18] (which prove hardness
of exact optimization for a single additive/unit-demand buyer) with folklore LPs (which provide
poly-time algorithms for exact optimization for a single additive/unit-demand buyer) is that the
hardness results rule out poly(m)-time solutions, whereas the LPs run in time exp(m) (which is
the size of the support of the distribution). Similarly, the way to reconcile our results (which prove
strong hardness of approximation for matroid-based) with [11, 15, 31] (which provides constant-
factor approximations for a single subadditive buyer) is that these constant-factor approximations
require the independent items assumption.
1.2 Summary and Roadmap
Ourmain results complete the picture for the [9] reduction, establishing an approximation-presering
reduction from ODP to MDMDP, and moreover that MDMDP is inapproximable within non-
trivial factors as soon as we move beyond c-demand valuations. Section 2 formally states the prob-
lems we study, and recaps prior work [9] in more detail. Section 3 establishes a clean framework
to prove when ODP is inapproximable. Section 4 provides our reduction and concludes with our
main theorem statements. The appendix contains all omitted proofs, along with some examples
demonstrating interesting facts about some of our tools along the way.
2 PRELIMINARIES
2.1 Valuation Functions and Input
A valuation function takes as input a set S of items and outputs a valuev(S). Throughout the paper,
[m] will denote the “base set” of m items (although our reductions will create additional items).
For ease of notation, and to help the reader parse parameters, we will w.l.o.g. scale all valuation
functions so that v(S) ∈ N for all S (this is w.l.o.g. when v(S) is rational for all S , which is itself
w.l.o.g. due to ε-truthful-to-truthful reductions of, e.g., [31, Theorem 5.2]). Moreover, all valuations
considered in this paper are normalized (v() = 0), monotone (v(S ∪ T ) ≥ v(S) for all S,T ), and
have no trivial items (v(S) > 0 for all S , ).7 Finally, when S is a random variable, we will abuse
notation and let v(S) := ES [v(S)]. Below are the two main classes of valuations that our main
5OXS is defined in Section 2.
6This is because their produced MDMDP instances always have support 2, and it is trivial to get a 1/2-approximation on
instances of support 2.
7We will confirm that no trivial items is w.l.o.g. once we define our formal problems.
results reference. Appendix E contains definitions of related classes of interest. Note that OXS (
Matroid-based ( Gross Substitutes ( Submodular.
• OXS: there is a weighted bipartite graphG with nodes L = [m] on the left and R on the right.
v(S) is the size of the max weight matching using nodes S on the left and R on the right.
When all weights are 1 or 0, call this binary OXS.
• Matroid-based: let I be independent sets of a matroid on [m], and wi be weights for each
i ∈ [m]. Then v(S) := maxT ⊆S,T ∈I{
∑
i ∈T wi }. When eachwi = 1, call this matroid-rank.
Representing Valuation Functions. All problems we consider require a valuation function to be
“input.” Our theorem statements will be precise about what input models are assumed, although
our results hold for most reasonable input models not explicitly discussed.
• Value oracle: eachv(·) is given via a black box which takes as input a set S and outputs v(S).
• Demand oracle: each v(·) is given via a black box which takes as input a vector ®p of prices
and outputs a set in argmaxT {v(T ) −
∑
i ∈T pi }.
• Explicit input: each v(·) is given explicitly via a circuit or Turing machine which takes as
input a set S and outputs v(S). We will only consider succinct representations (that is, cir-
cuits/Turing machines which are of polynomial size/runtime for inputs of sizem).
2.2 Formal Problem Statements
The first problem we study is simply Bayesian revenue maximization, but we will be precise with
how the input is specified to correctly place it with prior work. We use the language of [9] when
possible to draw connections, although we will drop unnecessary parameters.
MDMDP(V) — Multi-Dimensional Mechanism Design Problem for classV :
Input: an explicit distribution D over k valuation functions in V (given by listing all v(·) in the
support, and the probability with which they are drawn from D).
Output: for each v(·) in the support of D, a (possibly randomized) set Sv and a price pv such that
v(Sv) − pv ≥ v(Sw) − pw for all v,w in the support of D.
Objective: maximize
∑
v Pr[v ← D] · pv , the expected revenue.
Approximation: a solution guarantees an α-approximation if
∑
v Pr[v ← D] · pv ≥ α · OPT.
The lens by which we study MDMDP is the following standard optimization problem.
ODP(V) — Optimize Difference Problem for classV:
Input: two functions v(·) andw(·), both in V.
Output: a (possibly randomized) set, S .
Objective: maximize v(S) −w(S).
Approximation: a solution guarantees an α-approximation if v(S) −w(S) ≥ α · OPT.89
8Observe above that if both v(·) andw (·) are subadditive, and v(T ) = 0, thenv(S ∪T ) = v(S ) for all S , whilew (S ∪T ) ≥
w (S ) for all S . Therefore, it is without loss to remove the items in T from consideration. Similarly, if w (T ) = 0, then
w (S ∪ T ) = w (S ) for all S , while v(S ∪ T ) ≥ v(S ) for all S . Therefore, it is without loss to solve ODP after removing
T , and then add all items in T back at the end. We therefore will pre-process any input to ODP by first finding all items
i such that v({i }) = 0 and removing them, and all items i such that w ({i }) = 0 and removing them (to add back later).
Therefore, it is indeed w.l.o.g. to assume no trivial sets.
9We will also assume w.l.o.g. that there exists an S for which v(S ) > w (S ). This is without loss because if we have an
algorithm A which succeeds only on such instances, we can first run this algorithm on an arbitrary instance to get a set
T , and check if v(T ) ≥ w (T ). If so, then output this (and either we were in a case where the algorithm succeeds, or the
optimum is 0 and the algorithm succeeds anyway). If not, then output  (because v(T ) < w (T ) would prove that our
The final problem we study was introduced by [9], and shown to have connections toMDMDP.
SADP essentially provides a list of related ODPs, and allows a solution to any of them.
SADP(V) — Solve Any Differences Problem for classV :
Input: a finite list of functions v1(·), . . . ,vk (·), all inV .
Output: a (possibly randomized) set, S .
Objective: for some j ∈ [k − 1], have S maximize vj (S) −vj+1(S).
Approximation: a solution guarantees an α-approximation if there exists a j ∈ [k − 1] such that
vj (S) −vj+1(S) ≥ α ·maxT {vj (T ) −vj+1(T )}.
2.3 Recap of [9]
Finally, we briefly recap the main tools/results from [9] which are relevant for this paper. Recall
that the focus of this paper is on hardness, and we establish our results with just a single buyer.
Therefore, we will not recap the results of [9] in their full multi-buyer generality, but just focus on
the single-buyer implications. Below, for any valuation classV ,V∗ denotes its conic closure. That
is,V∗ denotes the closure ofV under non-negative linear combinations. Many natural valuation
classes (e.g. submodular, XOS, subadditive, additive) are already closed under conic combinations,
but others (unit-demand, c-demand, OXS, matroid-based, gross substitutes) are not.
Theorem 1 ([9]). For all V, there is a poly-time, approximation-preserving black-box reduction
from MDMDP(V) to ODP(V∗). That is, an α-approximation algorithm for MDMDP(V) (in any
input model) exists using poly(support(D),m) black-box queries to an α-approximation algorithm for
ODP(V∗) (in that same input model), and additional runtime poly(support(D),m).
For a single buyer, the positive applications of Theorem 1 are not particularly impressive, and
imply only that MDMDP can be solved exactly whenever buyers are c-demand (which could al-
ternatively be deduced by a simple linear program) — their main positive results are for multiple
buyers. Again, our main result is an approximation-preserving reduction in the other direction,
from ODP to MDMDP.
As referenced above, [9] also proves hardness of approximation for MDMDP(submodular). We
make use of their machinery, which requires several definitions to precisely state. Without re-
peating the entire [9] hardness of approximation, it is perhaps impossible to motivate why these
precise definitions are relevant, as they are technical in nature. However, we do give intuition to
parse what the definitions are stating, and roughly the role they serve in prior work.
The first definition, Compatibility, is given below. Immediately afterwards, we provide context
to help parse the condition.
Definition 1 (Compatibility). We say that a list of valuation functions V = (v1, . . . ,vk ) and a list
of (possibly randomized) sets X = (X1, . . . ,Xk ) are compatible if:
• X and V are cyclic monotone. That is, the welfare-maximizing matching of valuations V to
allocations X (that is, which maximizes
∑k
i=1vi (XM(i ))) is to match Xi to vi for all i .
• For any i < j , the welfare-maximizing matching of valuations vi+1, . . . ,vj to allocations
Xi , . . . ,X j−1 is to match allocation Xℓ to valuation vℓ+1 for all ℓ.
algorithm failed, and therefore we are in a case where the optimum must be 0). So we will also assume this w.l.o.g. for our
future reductions.
One should parse Compatibility as a stronger condition than cyclic monotonicity (indeed, the
first bullet is precisely cyclic monotonicity). Cyclic monotonicity requires that a particular match-
ing on the complete bipartite graph is max-weight. Compatibility requires that a particular match-
ing on several proper subgraphs are also max-weight. Intuitively, the particular restrictions in bul-
let two assert that higher-indexed allocations are “better”, and higher-index valuations are “more
important” (and therefore, the welfare-maximizing allocation always gives “better” allocations to
“more important” valuations).
The next technical definition is a restriction on potential inputs to SADP. Intuitively, this con-
dition serves the following purpose: the [9] reduction from SADP to MDMDP will take an input
to SADP, and pass it on to MDMDP, and one part of their proof needs to establish the existence
of a high-revenue solution to the producedMDMDP instance (so that any α-approximation must
also produce high revenue). C-compatibility suffices for this (but we will not attempt to explain
further why this is the case, and refer the reader to [9] for more detail).
Definition 2 (C-compatible). A list of valuation functions (v1, . . . ,vk ) is C-compatible if there
exist integers 1 = Q1 < . . . < Qk , all at most 2
C , and allocations (X1, . . . ,Xk ) such that:
• For all ℓ ∈ [k − 1], Xℓ ∈ argmax{vℓ(S) − vℓ+1(S)}.
• (Q1 ·v1, . . . ,Qk · vk ) is compatible with (X1, . . . ,Xk ).
The final technical definition in their reduction is balanced-ness. This condition is used in their
reduction to guarantee quality of approximation for the original SADP instance. The intuition
to have in mind is that when given as input to MDMDP a distribution of support k , it is trivial
to get a 1/k-approximation simply by targeting the valuation in the support which maximizes
v([m]) · Pr[v ← D] (and setting price v([m]) for [m], and no other options). Put another way, it’s
possible to guarantee a 1/k (or comparably poor) approximation to MDMDP without engaging
with the instance at all. The purpose of their d-balanced property guarantees that sufficiently
good approximations to the MDMDP instance produced by their reduction must actually engage
the initial SADP instance.
Definition 3 (d-balanced). A list of functions (v1, . . . ,vk ) is d-balanced if vk ([m]) ≤ d · (vℓ(X ) −
vℓ+1(X )) for all ℓ ∈ [k − 1], X = argmaxT {vℓ(T ) −vℓ+1(T )}.
Following the intuition of the preceding paragraph,d-balanced aims to upper bound the revenue
a seller could get on a SADP instance by simply selling [m] to vk (·) and ignoring everything else.
With these two definitions, we may state the reduction of [9] from SADP to MDMDP:10
Theorem 2 ([9]). Let A be an α-approximation algorithm for MDMDP(V). Then a solution to any
C-compatible instance (v1, . . . ,vk ) of SADP(V) can be found in polynomial time plus one black-box
call to A. The solution has the following properties:
• (Quality) If the SADP input is d-balanced, then the solution is an (α −
(1−α )d
k−1 )-approximation.
• (Complexity) If for all i , vi ([m]) ≤ 2
b thenw([m]) ≤ 2b+C for allw(·) input to A. Moreover, all
probabilities input to A can be written as the ratio of two integers at most 22C .
The intended application of Theorem2 is then to find a hard instance of SADPwhich is (a) (≪ k)-
balanced — this guarantees that the resulting guarantee on SADP is close to α , and (b) poly(m)-
compatible — this guarantees that the input passed on to MDMDP blows up by only a poly(m)
10This is indeed a correct statement of [9] Theorem 7 after chasing through their SADP choice of parameters.
factor. The appealing feature of Theorem 2 is that it suffices to establish thatMDMDP(submodular
functions) is inapproximable within any polynomial factor, by directly constructing a hard instance
of SADP with k = poly(m) valuations which is (≪ k)-balanced and poly(m)-compatible.
The unappealing feature of Theorem2 is that SADP is not a particularly natural problem to think
about, nor are the compatibility/balanced properties (hence, the need for a substantial preliminary
section just to state their result). Additionally, ODP is a very special case of SADP whose solution
suffice forMDMDP but Theorem 2 only establishes thatMDMDP is hard when SADP is hard for
large values of k .
Our work addresses both shortcomings. Theorem 11 provides a formal statement, which essen-
tially replaces SADPwithODP (truly establishing that the [9] reduction is tight), and removes any
compatibility/balanced requirements on the input instance (allowing greater ease of application
to valuation classes significantly more restrictive than submodular).
3 WHEN IS ODP HARD?
Before diving into the technical part of our reduction, we’d first like a clean way to reason about
valuation classes for which ODP is hard. Becuase ODP has a mixed-sign objective, one naturally
expects that it is either solvable exactly in poly-time, or hard to even distinguish whether the
optimum is non-zero (although there are sometimes exceptions to this intuition [21]). What’s not
immediately clear is how richV needs to be before ODP becomes unsolvable in poly-time (e.g. it
is solvable for additive functions, but not for submodular, what about in between?). In this section,
we show that even ODP(binary OXS) is inapproximable. We begin with a general construction of
hard instances:
Definition 4 (Perturbable). For v, S , define vS (T ) := v(T ) if S , T , and vS (S) := v(S) − 1. ClassV
is (x ,y)-perturbable if there exists a v(·) ∈ V such that vS (·) ∈ V for x distinct S , and v([m]) = y.
V is efficiently (x ,y)-perturbable if further there is a computationally-efficient bijection from
the x sets to [x], and there is a poly-sized circuit/poly-time Turing machine which computes v(·).
The parameter y will not be used in this section, and is not necessary to establish when ODP is
hard, but we will need to reference the parameter in the technical parts of our reduction. Lemma 3
establishes that ODP is hard for highly-perturbable ((x ,y)-perturbable for large x ) classes. Intu-
itively, this is because the x ODP instances of the form (v,vS ) each have disjoint solutions, but are
hard to distinguish. Proofs of the following two lemmas appear in Appendix A.
Lemma 3. Let V be (x ,y)-perturbable. Then any value- or demand-oracle algorithm for ODP(V)
which guarantees an α-approximation for any α > 0 with probability q makes ≥
qx−1
2 queries.
If V is efficiently (x ,y)-perturbable for x = exp(m), then no randomized, poly-time algorithm for
explicit input guarantees an α-approximation for any α > 0 w.p. 1/poly(m), unless NP ⊆ RP.
Lemma 4. Binary OXS is efficiently (
( m
m/2
)
,m/2)-perturbable.11
Lemmas 3 and 4 together immediately conclude thatODP(BinaryOXS) is inapproximablewithin
any non-zero factor with poly(m) value or demand queries, or within poly-time unless NP ⊆ RP.
11So every superclass of Binary OXS (including Matroid-based) is efficiently (
( m
m/2
)
,m/2)-perturbable as well.
4 FROM ODP TO SADP
Now that we knowODP is hard even for fairly basic combinatorial valuations, we wish to leverage
this to establish that the particular SADP instances needed for Theorem 2 are also hard. Again, the
goal of this section is to provide a reduction from ODP to SADP, while also chasing through the
parameters it implies for a full reduction from ODP to MDMDP. Before providing our reduction,
let’s get some intuition for the main challenges through some simple failed attempts. Recall that
an α approximation for MDMDP implies an (α −
(1−α )d
k−1 ) approximation for SADP. We want this
to be as close to α as possible, so the properties we care about are:
• How balanced is the resulting SADP instance? (Smaller d is better).
• How many functions are input to the SADP instance? (Larger k is better).
• Is the instance poly(m)-compatible? (Necessary for the reduction to be valid — otherwise it
will produce inputs toMDMDP of super-polynomial size).
Failed Attempt 1. The obvious first attempt is to just observe thatODP is a special case of SADP
and simply “reduce” from ODP to SADP by copying the original instance itself into Theorem 2.
This reduction is clearly correct, but let’s examine what parameters we get from this reduction,
using our (
( m
m/2
)
,m/2)-perturbable v as a representative instance:
• In that construction,w([m]) =m/2, and maxT {v(T ) −w(T )} = 1, so it is (m/2)-balanced.
• There are two functions input to ODP, so k = 2.
From above,d/(k−1) =m/2. So even if the instancewere poly(m)-compatible, anα-approximation
forMDMDPwouldn’t even imply a non-trivial guarantee for any α ≤ 11+2/m . Recall again the intu-
ition for this: in the [9] reduction, k will be the size of the support of the produced d forMDMDP.
If k = 2, it’s trivial to get a 1/2-approximation without engaging SADP at all. So in order to get
stronger hardness of approximation, we need much larger k .
Failed Attempt 2. Here is a next attempt, which takes k as large as desired. Let v,w be the given
ODP instance, and definevℓ(·) := (k−ℓ) ·v(·)+(ℓ−1) ·w(·).Observe that for any ℓ,vℓ(·)−vℓ+1(·) =
v(·) −w(·), so every consecutive difference is solving exactly the ODP instance we care about, and
an α-approximation for this SADP(v1, . . . ,vk ) will indeed yield an α-approximation forODP(v,w).
Let’s check the parameters when we apply Theorem 2 with our hard ODP instance:
• w([m]) =m/2, and ourvk ([m]) = (k−1) ·w([m]) = (k−1)m/2. Also, maxT {v(T )−w(T )} = 1,
so maxT {vℓ(T ) −vℓ+1(T )} = 1 for all ℓ, and the instance is (k − 1)m/2-balanced.
• We can set k as we please.
Again, even if the instance were poly(m)-compatible, an α-approximation for MDMDP still
wouldn’t imply non-trivial guarantees for any α ≤ 1
1+2/m
(because still d/(k − 1) = m/2). What
we learn from these first two failed attempts is that we need to somehow let k be large in our
construction (have many functions), while simultaneously not letting vk ([m]) grow too big.
FailedAttempt 3.Our final failed attempt will also demonstrate one of our key insights: introduce
extra items in the SADP instance. Specifically (for this construction), if we are initially given an
ODP instance onm items, and wish to produce a SADP instance with k valuation functions, add
an additional k items. Call the initial items M and the additional items K . For any set S ⊆ M ∪ K ,
write it as S = SM ⊔ SK (where SM = S ∩M , SK = S ∩ K ).
12 Define vℓ(S) to be equal to v(SM ) if
and only if |SK | ≥ ℓ, and w(SM ) if and only if |SK | ≤ ℓ − 1 (note that this is a somewhat bizarre
valuation function, which essentially treats the items inK as a bit to decide whether the items inM
12As SM ∩ SK = , SM ⊔ SK = SM ∪ SK . We use the disjoint union notation here (and in several other places) to remind
the reader that these sets are always disjoint.
are valued using v(·) orw(·)). It is not hard to see that any α-approximation on this SADP instance
implies an α-approximation on our desired ODP instance. Let’s again compute the parameters of
the reduction for our hard ODP instance.
• w([m]) = m/2, and our vk ([m]) = w([m]) = m/2. Also, it is not hard to see that for a given
ℓ, maxT {vℓ(T ) −vℓ+1(T )} = 1. So the instance is (m/2)-balanced.
• We can set k as we please.
Now, we’re in good shape with parameters: we could (for example) set k =mc for any constant
c , and establish that any m−c+1-approximation for MDMDP instances with mc items implies a
(> 0)-approximation for ODP on m items, which we ruled out in Section 3. The catch is that
our produced SADP instance has bizarre valuation functions. So all we have done is shown that
MDMDP(bizarre valuation class) is hard.
4.1 Our Reduction
The previous examples illustrate the reasoning one needs to go through to analyze a reduction,
and also identify some of the technical challenges. The two main (good) ideas we saw from the
failed attempts were (a) introducing extra items and (b) “truncating” the valuations in a way that
let k grow large while keeping d small. The challenge we did not yet overcome was how to do this
in a way that preserves membership in interesting valuation classes, and we did not attempt to
address Compatibility. We’ll present our construction in two steps. The first adds additional items,
but does not yet truncate.
Reduction Step One: Scaled Disjoint Unions.
Input: v(·),w(·), both in V (input to ODP(V)), k (desired number of valuations for SADP).
Output: v1(·), . . . ,vk (·). Each vℓ(·) takes as input subsets of (k − 1)m items. Partition these items
intoM1⊔. . .⊔Mk−1, with each |Mℓ | =m. For any S ⊆ M1⊔. . .⊔Mk−1, write it as S := S1⊔. . .⊔Sk−1
(with each Sℓ := S ∩Mℓ). Define vℓ(S) :=
∑
i≥ℓ(k + i) · v(Si ) +
∑
i<ℓ(k + i) ·w(Si ).
That is, we make k − 1 copies of them items, have eachvℓ(·) behave either as v orw (scaled) on
each copy, and then sum them. Observe that vℓ(·) switches fromv tow exactly at copy ℓ, and that
each vℓ(·) is a disjoint union of valuations in V , formally defined below. This operation happens
to preserve membership in the valuation classes we care about.
For scaling, observe that all classes we consider except for Binary OXS and matroid-rank (be-
cause they insist on binary values) are closed under non-negative scaling. The scaling in each
partition will not become relevant until the very end when we need to prove that the produced
instance is poly(m)-compatible.
Definition 5 (Disjoint Union of Valuations). The disjoint union of two valuations v(·) and w(·)
each on items M creates two copiesM1 ⊔M2, and outputs a valuation z(·) such that z(S) := v(S ∩
M1) +w(S ∩M2).
Fact 1. Additive, Binary OXS, OXS, Matroid-rank, Matroid-Based, Gross Substitutes, Submodular,
XOS, and Subadditive valuations are closed under Disjoint Union. Unit-demand/c-demand are not.
So we’re in good shape so far in the sense that if we start with (say) matroid-based valuations in
our ODP instance, we get back matroid-based valuations in our SADP instance. But we have not
yet made any progress towards bounding the balanced-ness. Our next step is to properly truncate
the valuations to make the valuations more balanced.We define two truncations below, whichmay
inspire different related work. However, only Item Truncation is necessary for our main result, so
we will focus the remaining presentation and formal statements on Item Truncation.
Reduction Step Two: Item Truncation.
Input: vℓ(·), a valuation function and y, a desired truncation.
Output: v ′
ℓ
(·), defined so that v ′
ℓ
(S) := maxT ⊆S, |T |≤y{vℓ(T )}.
Alternate Reduction Step Two: Value Truncation.
Input: vℓ(·), a valuation function and x , a desired truncation.
Output: v ′
ℓ
(·), defined so that v ′
ℓ
(S) := min{vℓ(S), x}.
We prove in Appendix B that matroid-based valuations are closed under item truncation, as this
is the class/truncation we’ll use for our main results. We state afterwards which other classes are
closed under each truncation (proofs omitted, as we will not use these results elsewhere).
Lemma 5. The class of matroid-rank valuations is closed under item truncation for any y.
Fact 2. Unit-demand, Submodular, XOS, and Subadditive are closed under value truncation for all x .
Additive, k-demand, Binary OXS, OXS, Matroid-rank, Matroid-based, Gross Substitutes are not (there
exist x , and a function v(·) in each of these classes for which value-truncating v(·) at x is no longer
in that class).
Fact 3. Unit-demand, Matroid-rank, Gross Substitutes, XOS, and Subadditive are closed under item
truncation for all y.13 Additive, k-demand, Binary OXS, OXS, and Submodular are not.
Again, recall that Lemma 5 is all that’s necessary for our main results (as hardness for matroid-
rank implies hardness for all superclasses). Facts 2 and 3 are included for the sake of better un-
derstanding the truncation operations. One curious conclusion of Fact 3 is that the property of
being closed under item-truncation “skips” submodular functions. Note also that value-truncation
preserves submodularity but not Gross Substiutes, whereas item-truncation preserves Gross Sub-
stitutes but not submodularity.
4.2 Correctness, Balancedness, and Compatibility
Now, we want to establish that our reduction correctly solves the initial ODP instance, and also
examine the parameters of the produced SADP instance. Our full reduction takes anODP instance
and first puts it through the Scaled Disjoint Union reduction with parameter k to get k valuations
each on (k − 1)m items. Then, it puts each of these valuations through item truncation with pa-
rameterm. For a givenODP instance (v,w), call the resulting SADP instance IT (v,w). Appendix B
contains a proof of Lemma 6, and Appendix C contains analogous claims for value truncation.
13Of these, the claim for Gross Substitutes (like most properties of Gross Substitutes) is non-trivial to establish, and uses
the fact that Gross Substitutes functions are well-layered [27].
Lemma 6. Let S be an α-approximation to the SADP instance IT (v,w). Then with an additional
O(k2m) runtime/value queries (to the item-truncated values), anα-approximation to theODP instance
(v,w) can be found.
Next, we want to see how well-balanced the instance is. Importantly, observe that the bound in
Lemma 7 does not grow with k .
Lemma 7. For any ODP instance (v,w), the instance IT (v,w) is 2mw([m])-balanced.
So at this point we have a reduction from ODP to very balanced instances of SADP, which also
preserve valuation class membership for matroid-based valuation functions. Our last steps are to
ensure that we can indeed compute value queries for our generated functions, and also to ensure
that the resulting instance is poly(m)-compatible. Lemma 8 below is necessary for the following
reason: Lemma 6 requires value queries on values generated for IT (v,w). However, our input to
ODP only provides access to v,w , which may not suffice for this.
Definition 6. Say that a list of valuation functions V is query-sufficient for a list W if (a) it is
possible to execute value queries for every function inW using polynomially-many value queries
for functions inV and (b) it is possible to write succinct circuits/Turing machines to compute value
queries for every function inW using succinct circuits/Turing machines computing value queries
for every function in V .
Matroid-based v,w , due to connections with greedy algorithms, are indeed query-sufficient.
Lemma 8. When v,w are matroid-based, v,w are query-sufficient for IT (v,w).
Lemma 8 confirms that if ourODP instance is given via explicit input or value queries, then this
is enough to simulate value queries on eachvℓ(·)we construct. The last step is compatibility. We’ll
begin with a general sufficient condition for an instance to be Compatible, and finally establish
that our instances satisfy this condition.
Lemma 9. Let v1, . . . ,vk be such that there exists allocations X1, . . . ,Xk satisfying:
(1) For all ℓ, Xℓ ∈ argmaxS {vℓ(S) −vℓ+1(S)}.
(2) vℓ(Xi ) ≤ C1 for all ℓ, i .
(3) vℓ(Xℓ) ≥ vℓ(Xℓ−1) + 1 ≥ vℓ(Xi ) + 2, for all ℓ > 1, i ≤ ℓ − 2.
Then (v1, . . . ,vk ) is k log2(C1)-Compatible.
Our last step is to establish that our IT (v,w) instance satisfies the hypotheses of Lemma 9.
Corollary 10. IT (v,w) is k log2(2kmax{v([m]),w([m])})-Compatible.
4.3 Puing Everything Together
With all the pieces now in place, we can now prove Theorem 11. We briefly note that Theorem 11
also holds after replacing item truncation with value truncation (and the proof simply replaces
Lemma 6 with Lemma 14).
Theorem 11. Let V be closed under non-negative scaling, disjoint union, and item truncation, and
let (v,w) be query-sufficient for IT (v,w) whenever v,w ∈ V. Let also A be an α-approximation
algorithm for MDMDP(V) using either value oracles or explicit input. Then for any integer k ≥ 2,
given black-box access A, there is a poly(km)-time algorithm for ODP(V) making a single black-box
call to A plus an additional poly(km) value queries to the ODP input with the following properties:
• (Quality) On ODP input (v,w), the algorithm produces an (α −
(1−α )2mw ([m])
k−1 )-approximation.
• (Complexity) Each value vℓ(·) input to A takes as input subsets of [(k − 1)m], and satisfies
vℓ([(k − 1)m]) ≤ (2kmax{v([m]),w([m])})
k. Moreover, all probabilities input to A can be
written as the ratio of two integers at most (2kmax{v([m]),w([m])})2k .
Proof. To complete the proof, we just need to carefully track all the pieces we put together. The
fact that V is closed under non-negative scaling, disjoint union, and item truncation guarantees
that IT (v,w) will only contain valuations inV (they will also take as input subsets of [(k − 1)m]).
By Lemma 6, any α-approximation to the SADP instance IT (v,w) yields an α-approximation to
the ODP instance (v,w) (in poly-time, because (v,w) is query-sufficient for IT (v,w)). So our goal
is to solve the SADP instance IT (v,w), which is an instance of SADP(V).
Lemma 7 establishes that IT (v,w) is 2mw([m])-balanced,andCorollary 10 establishes that IT (v,w)
is k log2(2kmax{v([m]),w([m])}-Compatible. Therefore, we can solve the SADP instance IT (v,w)
using Theorem 2, and the approximation/complexity guarantees match up. 
We can now apply Theorem 11 to establish that MDMDP(V) is hard for perturbableV .
Theorem 12. Let V be closed under non-negative scaling, disjoint union, and item truncation, and
let (v,w) be query-sufficient for IT (v,w) whenever v,w ∈ V .
• For any integer k ≥ 2, ifV is (x ,y)-perturbable, then no better than a
2my
k−1+2my -approximation
for MDMDP(V) can be guaranteed with probability q on instances with (k − 1)m items with
fewer than
qx−1
2 − poly(km) queries the value oracle model.
14
• For any k = poly(m), if V is efficiently (x ,y)-perturbable for x = exp(m), then no better than
a
2my
k−1+2my -approximation for MDMDP(V) can be guaranteed with probability 1/poly(m) on
instances with (k − 1)m items in the explicit input model, unless NP ⊆ RP.
Theorem 12 implies that MDMDP(matroid-based) is inapproximable within non-trivial factors.
Theorem 13. For all ε > 0, there does not exist an algorithm making poly(m) value queries in the
value oracle model, poly(m) demand queries in the demand oracle model, or a poly-time algorithm in
the explicit input model (unless NP ⊆ RP) guaranteeing an 1/m1−ε -approximation with probability
at least 1/poly(m) for MDMDP(matroid-based) on instances withm items andm1−2ε/9 values in the
support of D.
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A OMITTED PROOFS FROM SECTION 3
Proof of Lemma 3. Let v witness that V is (x ,y)-perturbable, and consider being given the
ODP input (v,vS ), for some S such thatvS ∈ V chosen uniformly at random. Then S is the unique
optimum, and the only set which guarantees an α-approximation for any α > 0. First consider
any (randomized) value-oracle algorithm which makes at most s queries. Using the principle of
deferred decisions, first select the (random) prices to query conditioned on all previous responses
being consistent with v(·). Then as only one possible query (S) will be inconsistent with v(·), and S
is chosen uniformly at random, we have that except with probability s/x , all queries are consistent
with v(·). When all queries are consistent with v(·), the algorithm must make some guess, which
will be correct with probability at most 1/(x − s). So the total success probability is at most s/x +
1/(x − s). Setting s =
qx−1
2 has this always at most q.
Next, consider (randomized) demand-oracle algorithms which make at most s queries. Observe
first that the only difference between a demand query for v and a demand query for vS can come
on a vector of prices ®p for which the demand query for v on ®p outputs S (this is because if any set
T , S is v’s favorite, it is certainly vS ’s favorite. But if S is v’s favorite, it may not bevS ’s favorite).
So again use the principle of deferred decisions, and select the (random) sets to query conditioned
on all previous responses being consistent with v(·). Then for each query made, there is at most
one S for whichvS might have output something different. Therefore, except with probability s/x ,
all queries are consistent with v(·). Again, the algorithm’s total success probability is therefore at
most s/x + 1/(x − s).
To see the final claim in the explicit input model, we develop a reduction from unique-SAT
(3-SAT where the promise is that there is exactly one or zero satisfying assignments). Given an
instance X of 3-SAT, consider a circuit/Turing machine which takes as input an assignment and
outputs yes if that assignment is satisfying (so the circuit would be poly-sized, and the Turing
machine would run in poly-time). Define now a circuit/Turing machine for a valuation fuction
vX (·)which takes as input a set S and outputsv(S) if S is not one of the x perturbing sets. Otherwise,
first map S to [x], and then take the corresponding assignment ϕ. If ϕ satisfies X , output v(S) − 1.
Otherwise, output v(S). Note that this entire procedure is computationally-efficient/can be done
with a poly-sized circuit becauseV is efficiently perturbable.
Now, assume for contradiction that there is a randomized algorithm forODP(V) which guaran-
tees a non-zero approximation with probably at least 1/poly(m). Given an instance X of unique-
SAT, run the algorithm on vX (·), and let S denote the output set. Observe that by the unique-SAT
promise, vX (·) ∈ V . Check if the assignment corresponding to S satisfies X , and if so, output “yes”
(otherwise, output “no”). This algorithm will clearly never mistakenly guess that X is satisfiable.
To see that it correctly says yes with probability at least 1/poly(m) (which, as usual, can be am-
plified to 2/3 or 1 − 1/poly(m) if desired), observe that whenever X is satisfiable uniquely by ϕ,
that the set S corresponding to ϕ is the only set guaranteeing an α-approximation for any α > 0.
Therefore, this set must be output with probability at least 1/poly(m) by our algorithm, implying
that we will output ϕ (and correctly guess yes) with probability at least 1/poly(m). But no such
algorithm for unique-SAT can exist unless NP ⊆ RP. 
Proof of Lemma 4. Consider the complete bipartite graph with m item nodes on the left and
m/2 nodes on the right. Let v(·) denote the binary OXS valuation corresponding to this graph.
Thenv(S) := min{|S |,m/2}, andv(·) is efficiently computable. Observe also that if we pick any set
S of sizem/2 and remove all edges from each left-hand node in S to (say) the top right-hand node
(so we remove a total ofm/2 edges), then we still have a binary OXS function. Moreover, we claim
that this function is now vS for the removed S .
Indeed, observe that for any set T of size < m/2, there is still a perfect matching from T to the
RHS, so we’ll still have v(T ) = |T |. For any set T of size ≥ m/2, perhaps T = S . If so, then clearly
the max-weight matching has sizem/2 − 1, as desired. Otherwise, T contains an element not in S ,
which has an edge to the top node. There are at leastm/2 − 1 left-hand nodes remaining, which
have edges to every other right-hand node, and therefore form a matching of sizem/2 − 1, for a
total matching ofm/2.
Therefore,v(·) can be perturbed at any set of sizem/2.We can index these sets lexicographically
to get an efficient mapping from these sets to [
( m
m/2
)
], as desired. 
B OMITTED PROOFS FROM SECTION 4
Proof of Lemma 5. To see the claim, consider the independent sets I for the matroid defining
v(·). It is well-known that updating Iy := {S ∈ I, |S | ≤ y} results in Iy being a matroid.
15 It is now
easy to see that v(·) item-truncated at y is exactly the matroid-based valuation corresponding to
Iy (with the exact same weightswe for all items e), so it is matroid-based as well. 
Proof of Lemma 6. Throughout the proof, we’ll letM denote one copy of the originalm items,
Mi denote the i
th copy, and use variables S,T , . . . to denote subsets of ⊔iMi , and variables A,B, . . .
to denote subsets ofM .
Let S = S1⊔ . . .⊔Sk−1 denote the α approximation to the SADP instance IT (v,w). First, we wish
to refine S so that |S | ≤ m, but it is still an α-approximation. To do this, observe that if |S | ≤ m
then we are done. Otherwise, for each ℓ there is a subset T ⊆ S with |T | = m and vℓ(S) = vℓ(T ).
To find thisT , go through each item i ∈ S one-by-one and check whether vℓ(S \ {i}) = vℓ(S). If so,
remove i and continue (because there is still a set T of sizem inside S \ {i} with vℓ(T ) = vℓ(S)). If
not, we know that every such T must contain i , so keep it. Stop when |S | = m. Observe that this
procedure must terminate, because any i < T will be removed when processed (and that it can be
implemented with only value queries to vℓ(·)).
15This is also easy to check: Clearly Iy is downwards closed. For any two independent sets S, T in Iy , with |S | < |T |,
the fact that I satisfies the augmentation property immediately implies that there exists i ∈ T such that S ∪ {i } ∈ I. As
|T | ≤ y , S ∪ {i } ∈ Iy as well, so Iy has the augmentation property too.
Do the above process for each ℓ, to get k candidate sets Sℓ , each of size at mostm. Next, simply
output argmaxℓ{v(S
ℓ
ℓ
) −w(Sℓ
ℓ
)} as the solution to the ODP instance (v,w). We claim this must be
an α-approximation.
Consider first the solution S , and the index ℓ for which vℓ(S) − vℓ+1(S) ≥ α · maxT {vℓ(T ) −
vℓ+1(T )}. First, obesrve that indeed maxT {vℓ(T ) −vℓ+1(T )} ≥ (k + ℓ)maxA{v(A) −w(A)}. This is
because one candidate for T is to set Sℓ = argmaxA{v(A) −w(A)}, and Si =  for all i , ℓ (which
results in exactly this difference). So we may now conclude that:
vℓ(S) −vℓ+1(S) ≥ α(k + ℓ) ·max
A
{v(A) −w(A)}.
Next, we claim that we must have vℓ(S
ℓ) − vℓ+1(S
ℓ) ≥ vℓ(S) − vℓ+1(S). This is simply because
Sℓ ⊆ S , but vℓ(S
ℓ) = vℓ(S) by definition. Therefore, we get:
vℓ(S
ℓ) −vℓ+1(S
ℓ) ≥ α(k + ℓ) ·max
A
{v(A) −w(A)}.
Finally, observe that |Sℓ | ≤ m, so we know that:
vℓ(S
ℓ) −vℓ+1(S
ℓ) =
∑
i≥ℓ
(k + i)v(Sℓi ) +
∑
i<ℓ
(k + i)w(Sℓi ) −
∑
i>ℓ
(k + i)v(Sℓi ) −
∑
i≤ℓ
(k + i)w(Sℓi )
= (k + ℓ) · (v(Sℓ
ℓ
) −w(Sℓ
ℓ
))
Therefore, we may conclude further that:
v(Sℓ
ℓ
) −w(Sℓ
ℓ
) ≥ α ·max
A
{v(A) −w(A)}.
The output of our algorithm is at least as good as Sℓ
ℓ
, because we take the maximum of this over
all potential ℓ, so we get an α-approximation. 
Proof of Lemma 7. No matter how large k is, any set withm items can get value from at most
m copies of M . Within each copy, the maximum possible is 2kw([m]), so the total value for any
set is at msot 2kmw([m]). Also, for all ℓ, maxS {vℓ(S) − vℓ+1(S)} ≥ (k + ℓ). So the instance is
2mw([m])-balanced. 
Proof of Lemma 8. The challenge is that, when |S | ≫ m, it’s not clear how to find the best
T ⊆ S of sizem. Indeed, it is not necessarily possible in poly-time when v,w are submodular, and
therefore some assumption on valuation classes is necessary.
But when v,w are matroid-based, recall that each vℓ(·) is matroid-based as well. This suggests
that a greedy algorithm can find the best T ⊆ S of sizem. Indeed, the following algorithm works:
(1) For each e ∈ S , find vℓ(e). This can be done with a single value query to either v(·) orw(·).
(2) Sort the elements in S in decreasing order of vℓ(e).
(3) Initialize T = .
(4) Process elements e ∈ S one at a time.
(a) If |T | =m, stop.
(b) Else, computevℓ(T ∪ {e}) −vℓ(T ). This can be done with two queries to either v(·) orw(·)
because |T | <m.
(c) If vℓ(T ∪ {e}) − vℓ(T ) > 0, add e to T . Otherwise, don’t.
(5) Output
∑
i≥ℓ(k + i) · v(Ti ) +
∑
i<ℓ(k + i) ·w(Ti ).
The algorithm above finds the max-weight independent subset of S , for the matroid defining the
matroid-based valuationvℓ(·), and the correct weights. Therefore, it correctly computesvℓ(S). 
Proof of Lemma 9. Consider the given allocations (X1, . . . ,Xk ) and the multipliersQi := (C1+
1)(i−1). Observe first that all multipliers are integers at most 2k log2(C1), as desired. Also, we are
already given that Xℓ ∈ argmax{vℓ(S) − vℓ+1(S)} for all ℓ. So we just need to establish that V =
(Q1 · v1, . . . ,Qk · vk ) is compatible with X = (X1, . . . ,Xk ).
First, let’s establish thatV and X are cyclic monotone. We proceed inductively from ℓ = k down
to 1 and prove that vℓ must be matched to Xℓ . Assume for inductive hypothesis that the max-
weight matching must match vi to Xi for all i > ℓ and consider now ℓ. Then consider the weight
contributed by the edge between vℓ and Xℓ , versus vℓ and any Xi , i < ℓ. By property 3, the former
edge contributes at least (C1 + 1)
ℓ−1 more than any other potential edge. At the same time, by
property 2, the maximum possible contribution from all edges < ℓ is at most
∑ℓ−1
i=1 (C1 + 1)
i−1C1 ≤
C1(C1 + 1)
ℓ−1/C1. Therefore, the maximum possible weight we can get from edges not adjacent to
vℓ is less than what we lose by not matching vℓ to Xℓ , and the max-weight matching must match
vℓ to Xℓ .
A nearly-identical argument establishes that themax-weightmatching of valuationsvi+1, . . . ,vj
to allocations Xi , . . . ,X j−1 is to match Xℓ to vℓ+1 for all ℓ. Again proceed inductively from ℓ = j
down to i+1, and assume for inductive hypothesis that the max-weightmatchingmust matchva to
Xa−1 for all a > ℓ. Consider again the weight contributed by the edge between vℓ and Xℓ−1 versus
vℓ and any Xi , i < ℓ − 1. By property 3, the former edge contributes at least (C1 + 1)
ℓ−1 more than
any other potential edge. At the same time, by property 2, themaximumpossible contribution from
all edges < ℓ is at most
∑ℓ−1
i=1 (C1 + 1)
i−1C1 ≤ C1(C1 + 1)
ℓ−1/C1. Therefore, the maximum possible
weight we can get from edges not adjacent to vℓ is less than what we lose by not matching vℓ to
Xℓ−1, and the max-weight matching must match vℓ to Xℓ−1.
This completes the proof that (v1, . . . ,vk ) is k log2(C1)-Compatible. 
Proof of Corollary 10. Consider the allocationsXℓ defined so thatXℓ∩Mℓ ∈ argmaxA{v(A)−
w(A)}, and Xℓ ∩Mi =  for all i , ℓ. Then we clearly satisfy hypothesis 1 in Lemma 9. To see this,
recall that for any set S , vℓ(S) − vℓ+1(S) ≤ vℓ(S ∩Mℓ) − vℓ+1(S ∩ Mℓ), and Xℓ is the optimal set
contained in Mℓ .
Hypothesis 2 is also clearly satisfied for C1 = 2kmax{v([m]),w([m])}. This follows because
vℓ(Mi ) ≤ 2kmax{v([m]),w([m])} for all ℓ.
Hypothesis 3 is satisfied for the following reasons. First, let A∗ := argmaxA{v(A) −w(A)}. We
know thatv(A∗)−w(A∗) ≥ 0.We also know thatvℓ(Xℓ) = (k+ℓ) ·v(A
∗), andvℓ(Xi ) = (k+i) ·w(A
∗)
for all i < ℓ. As v(A∗) ≥ w(A∗), we Hypothesis 3 holds as well.
By Lemma 9, wemay conclude that IT (v,vS ) is k log2(2kmax{v([m]),w([m])})-Compatible. 
Proof of Theorem 12. To see the first claim, assume for contradiction that such an algorithm
existed. Then with Theorem 11, we get an algorithm for ODP(V) which achieves a non-trivial
approximation on all instances (v,vS )with probability q with a total of
qx−1
2 −poly(km)+poly(km)
value queries (the extra queries come from Lemma 6). By Lemma 3, this is not possible. So the
original MDMDP(V) algorithm must not exist.
To see the second claim, assume again for contradiction that such an algorithm existed. Then
by Theorem 11, this would imply a poly-time algorithm with a non-trivial approximation on all
instances (v,vS ) with probability 1/poly(m)with total runtime poly(km) = poly(m). By Lemma 3,
this is impossible unless NP ⊆ RP. 
Proof of Theorem 13. This is a corollary of Theorem 12 and Lemma 4. As Binary OXS is
(exp(m),m/2)-perturbable, so is matroid-based. Therefore, Theorem12 implies thatMDMDP(matroid-
based) cannot be approximated better than m
2
k−1+m2
with probability 1/poly(m) on instances with
(k−1)m items and distributions of support k for any k = poly(m). Letting k =m2/ε , letm′ = km de-
note the number of items. Then there are k ≤ (m2/ε+1)1−ε/3 = (m′)1−ε/3 valuations in the support,
and the best achievable approximation guarantee ism2−2/ε ≤ (m2/ε+1)−1+3ε/2.
So setting ε ′ = 3ε/2, we see that with m′ items and (m′)1−2ε
′/9 valuations in the support of D,
we can’t get better than a (m′)1−ε
′
approximation.
The only missing step is to connect everything to the demand oracle model. Observe that be-
cause all valuations involved are matroid-based (and therefore Gross Substitutes), that in fact a de-
mand oracle can be implementedwith poly(m) value queries. So if we could solveMDMDP(matroid-
based) using demand queries, we could use a value oracle for the (v,w) input to ODP to get a
value oracle for the MDMDP instance as in the reduction, which is also good enough for demand
queries. 
C CLAIMS FOR VALUE TRUNCATION
Below, define the SADP instance VT (v,w) to first use the Disjoint Union reduction, followed by
the value-truncation reduction with parameter 2kv([m]).
Lemma 14. Let S be an α-approximation to the SADP instance VT (v,w). Then with an additional
O(k) runtime/value queries (to the value-truncated values), an α-approximation to the ODP instance
(v,w) can be found.
Proof. Throughout the proof, we’ll let M denote one copy of the originalm items, Mi denote
the ith copy, and use variables S,T , . . . to denote subsets of ⊔iMi , and variables A,B, . . . to denote
subsets ofM .
Let S = S1⊔ . . .⊔Sk−1 denote the α approximation to the SADP instanceVT (v,w) (the resulting
SADP instance from the value-truncation reduction). Simply output argmaxℓ{v(Sℓ) −w(Sℓ} (or 
if they all yield a negative answer) as the solution to the ODP instance (v,w). We claim this must
be an α-approximation.
Consider first the solution S , and the index ℓ for which vℓ(S) − vℓ+1(S) ≥ α · maxT {vℓ(T ) −
vℓ+1(T )}. First, observe that indeed maxT {vℓ(T ) − vℓ+1(T )} ≥ (k + ℓ)maxA{v(A) − w(A)}. This
is because one candidate for T is to set Sℓ = argmaxA{v(A) − w(A)}, and Si =  for all i , ℓ
(which results in at least this difference, because our truncation exceeds 2kv([m])). So we may
now conclude that:
vℓ(S) −vℓ+1(S) ≥ α(k + ℓ) ·max
A
{v(A) −w(A)}.
Next, there are a few cases to consider. First, perhaps vℓ+1(S) = 2kv([m]). In this case, vℓ(S) ≤
2kv([m]), so the LHS is 0, which guarantees an α-approximation. Therefore,  also guarantees an
α-approximation, so our algorithm succeeds. Next, perhaps vℓ+1(S) < 2kv([m]). In this case, we
get that:
vℓ(S) − vℓ+1(S) = vℓ(S) −
∑
i>ℓ
(k + i)v(Si) −
∑
i≤ℓ
(k + i)w(Si )
≤
∑
i≥ℓ
(k + i)v(Si) +
∑
i<ℓ
(k + i)w(Si) −
∑
i>ℓ
(k + i)v(Si) −
∑
i≤ℓ
(k + i)w(Si)
= (k + ℓ) · (v(Sℓ) −w(Sℓ))
Therefore, we may conclude further that:
v(Sℓ) −w(Sℓ) ≥ α ·max
A
{v(A) −w(A)}.
The output of our algorithm is at least as good as Sℓ , because we take the maximum of this over
all potential ℓ, so we get an α-approximation. 
Lemma 15. For any ODP instance (v,w), the instance VT (v,w) is 2v([m])-balanced.
Proof. Value-truncation explicitly capsvk (M1⊔. . .⊔Mk−1) at 2kv([m]). Also, for all ℓ, maxS {vℓ(S)−
vℓ+1(S)} ≥ (k + ℓ). So the instance is 2v([m])-balanced. 
Lemma 16. All v,w are query-sufficient for VT (v,w).
Proof. Simply observe that computing a value query for a function vℓ(S1 ⊔ . . . ⊔ Sk−1) simply
requires computing either v(Si ) or w(Si ) for all i , summing them, and taking a minimum with x ,
all of which can be done in time O(k). 
D EXAMPLE: SUBMODULAR IS NOT CLOSED UNDER ITEM TRUNCATION
Here we provide an example of a submodular function v and size parameter y such that v ′ :=
maxT ⊆S, |T |≤y{v(T )}. This is sufficient to prove that submodular functions are not closed under
item truncation, as our transformation of v is a special instance of item truncation with y = 2.
Table 1. Valuation function v
Sets of size 1 Value Sets of size 2 Value Sets of size 3 Value Sets of size 4 Value
{a} 5 {c,d} 10 {a,b,c} 9 {a,b,c,d} 10
{b} 5 {a,d} 9 {a,b,d} 10
{c} 5 {b,d} 9 {a,c,d} 10
{d} 5 {a,c} 9 {b,c,d} 10
{b,c} 9
{a,b} 9
We will use the following definition for submodularity: for any set of items X and any items
y, z < X , v(X ∪y ∪ z) −v(X ∪y) ≤ v(X ∪ z) −v(X ). We will prove this by considering all possible
sizes forX . IfX = : for all items y and z,v(y∪z) −v(y) ≤ 5 = v(z) −v(). If |X | = 1: for all items
y and z, v(X ∪y ∪ z) −v(X ∪y) ≤ 1 < 4 ≤ v(X ∪ z) −v(X ). Now consider the case where |X | = 2.
If z , d , X ∪ y cannot be the set {a,b, c}. In this case, v(X ∪ y) = v(X ∪ z) = 10, and therefore
v(X ∪ y ∪ z) − v(X ∪ y) = 0 ≤ v(X ∪ z) − v(X ). If z = d , then X , {c,d}, and therefore v(X ) = 9.
X ∪y must be equal to {a,b, c} and X ∪ z , {a,b, c}, so v(X ∪y) = 9 and v(X ∪ z) = 10. Putting it
all together, v(X ∪y ∪ z) −v(X ∪ y) = 10 − 9 = 1 = v(X ∪ z) −v(X ).
The function is also monotone. Note that the only sets (X ,Y ) where |X | < |Y | but v(X ) > v(Y )
are ({c,d}, {a,b, c}). In this case X * Y , so it does not violate monotonicity. Thus, v represents a
monotone submodular function (so there’s nothing "weird" about our counterexample).
Now let us define a function v ′ as maxT ⊆S, |T |≤2{v(T )}. Note that v and v
′ will differ in evalua-
tion only over {a,b,d}, where v(a,b,d) = 10 and v ′(a,b,d) = 9. All other subsets of size greater
than 2 contain the subset {c,d} with value 10.
v ′ is not submodular. Note that
v ′(a,b, c,d) −v ′(a,b,d) = 1 > 0 = v ′(a,b, c) −v ′(a,b)
If we let X = {a,b}, x = c and y = d , we see that v ′(X ∪ x ∪ y) − v ′(X ∪ y) > v ′(X ∪ x) − v ′(X ),
thus contradicting the submodularity definition.
E VALUATION CLASSES
The following valuation classes are referenced throughout the text. They are listed below in strictly
increasing order of generality.
• Additive: for all S , v(S) :=
∑
i ∈S v({i}). Unit-demand: for all S , v(S) := maxi ∈S v({i}).
• c-demand: for all S , v(S) := maxT ⊆S, |T |≤c {
∑
i ∈T v({i}).
• OXS: there is a weighted bipartite graphG with nodes L = [m] on the left and R on the right.
v(S) is the size of the max weight matching using nodes S on the left and R on the right.
When all weights are 1 or 0, call this binary OXS.
• Matroid-based: let I be independent sets of a matroid on [m], and wi be weights for each
i ∈ [m]. Then v(S) := maxT ⊆S,T ∈I{
∑
i ∈T wi }. When eachwi = 1, call this matroid-rank.
• Gross Substitutes: Let ®q, ®p be price vectors with qi ≥ pi for all i . Let P := {i,qi = pi }. For all
X ∈ argmaxS {v(S) −
∑
i ∈S pi }, there exists Y ∈ argmaxS {v(S) −
∑
i ∈S qi } with (P ∩X ) ⊆ Y .
• Submodular: for all S,T , v(S) +v(T ) ≥ v(S ∩T ) + v(S ∪T ).
• XOS:16 There exist additive functionsw1, . . . such that for all S , v(S) := maxj {w j (S)}.
• Subadditive: for all S,T , v(S) + v(T ) ≥ v(S ∪T ).
16Equivalently, Fractionally Subadditive.
